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Abstract
We use a new approach to assess long-term fiscal developments. By analyzing the time 
varying behaviour of the two components of government spending and revenue – 
responsiveness and persistence – we are able to infer about the sources of fiscal 
behaviour. Drawing on quarterly data we estimate recursively these components within 
a system of government revenue and spending equations using a Three-Stage Least 
Square method. In this way we track fiscal developments, i.e. possible fiscal 
deteriorations and/or improvements for eight European Union countries plus the US. 
Results suggest that positions have not significantly changed for Finland, France, 
Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the US, whilst they have improved for 
Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
Keywords: Fiscal Deterioration, Fiscal Sustainability.
JEL Classification: E62, H50. 
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Non-technical summary 
Over the last decades, several studies have addressed the issue of the sustainability 
of public finances. The issue is relevant since any inadequate fiscal policy behaviour may 
turn unstable the relationship between government spending and revenue, with the 
consequence of producing conditions for potential “fiscal deterioration” and lack of public 
finances sustainability. In practice, the trajectories of both expenditure and revenues 
deviate from the path ensuring the convergence towards the fiscal “equilibrium” in such a 
way that government spending grows faster than government revenue. 
In this paper we contribute to the literature by using a new approach to examine to 
what extent two main characteristics of fiscal policy behaviour, i) the sensitivity of fiscal 
variables to economic developments and the ii) dependence of fiscal behaviour on its own 
past developments, impact on the patterns of both government spending and revenue, 
thereby determining conditions of fiscal sustainability or fiscal deterioration. In order to 
address our problem, we decompose government spending and government revenue into 
two components: responsiveness and persistence. The former, can be defined as the 
response of fiscal policy to output, while persistence reflects the likely autocorrelation on 
budgetary policy decisions. As discussed in the empirical section, given that we are 
interested in testing whether and to what extent the time-varying behaviour of the fiscal 
policy characteristics may simultaneously influence the patterns of both expenditure and 
revenue and eventually determine conditions of fiscal deterioration, we need to estimate a 
specification including both the expenditure and revenue equations.  
Therefore, focusing on the development of the abovementioned fiscal policy 
characteristics, we are able to infer about deficit evolution over time and about the 
existence of possible fiscal deterioration. More interestingly, we can also assess whether 
changes in the fiscal positions are due to different degrees of responsiveness or persistence 
between government spending and revenue. 
We employ this approach to assess the fiscal developments for nine countries: 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the U.S. To 
this purpose we use a set of quarterly fiscal data taken from national accounts (in the case 
of the U.S. and the U.K.) or computed by drawing on the higher frequency (monthly) 
availability of fiscal cash data (in the case of the other countries). This is also a novelty 
with respect to the existing related literature, which generally focuses on annual data. 
 Our results suggest that fiscal deterioration has not been an issue for the majority 
of the countries analyzed. In fact, fiscal position has not significantly changed for Finland, 
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France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the US, whilst it has even improved for 
Belgium, Italy, and Netherlands.  
 We show that, for Italy, Belgium and (partially) for the Netherlands, fiscal 
improvement has been mainly driven by a higher responsiveness of government revenue 
relative to government spending. On the other hand, in the case of France, periods of fiscal 
deterioration can be attributed to the higher persistence of spending. Additionally, we have 
not detected conditions for potential fiscal deterioration or fiscal improvement in the other 
European Union countries (Finland, Germany, Spain, and the UK) plus the U.S.  For these 
countries, the empirical evidence suggests that non-significant change in the fiscal position 
is due to a similar behaviour in terms of persistence and responsiveness of government 
spending and government revenue or because higher revenue responsiveness has been 
balanced by higher spending persistence. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, several studies have addressed the issue of the sustainability 
of public finances. What the empirical literature usually tests is whether both government 
expenditures and government revenues display a fiscal sustainable “equilibrium” growth 
pattern over time. Under such condition, the two budgetary items tend to co-move, i.e. 
their structural (or long-run) relationship does not change throughout time, implying that 
the size of the government deficit remains stable and under the control of policymaker. 
However, it is worth noting that, the stability of the “equilibrium” is the result of the 
ability of the policymaker, in the presence of shocks, to act in such a way to assure that the 
gap between government revenue and expenditure remains unchanged.  
Any inadequate fiscal policy behaviour may turn  unstable the relationship between 
government spending and revenue with the consequence of producing conditions for 
potential “fiscal deterioration” and lack of public finances sustainability. In practice, the 
trajectories of both expenditure and revenues deviate from the path ensuring the 
convergence towards the fiscal “equilibrium” in such a way that government spending 
grows faster than government revenue. 
In this paper we contribute to the literature by using a new approach to examine to 
what extent two main characteristics of fiscal policy behaviour, i) the sensitivity of fiscal 
variables to economic developments and the ii) dependence of fiscal behaviour on its own 
past developments, impact on the patterns of both government spending and revenue, 
thereby determining conditions of fiscal sustainability or fiscal deterioration. In order to 
address our problem, and following the empirical works by Fatas and Mihov (2002), and 
Afonso et al. (2008), we decompose government spending and government revenue into 
two components: responsiveness and persistence. The former, can be defined as the 
response of fiscal policy to output, while persistence reflects the likely autocorrelation on 
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budgetary policy decisions. To note that, we depart from the above mentioned empirical 
studies in what concern the estimation methodology.  In fact, as further discussed in the 
empirical section, given that we are interested to test whether and to what extent the time-
varying behaviour of the fiscal policy characteristics may simultaneously influence the 
patterns of both expenditure and revenue and eventually determine conditions of fiscal 
deterioration, we need to estimate a system including both the expenditure and revenue 
equations.  
Therefore, focusing on the development of the abovementioned fiscal policy 
characteristics, we are able to infer about deficit evolution over time and about the 
existence of possible fiscal deterioration. More interestingly, we can also assess whether 
changes in the fiscal positions are due to different degree of responsiveness or persistence 
between government spending and revenue. 
We employ this approach to assess the fiscal developments for nine countries: 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the U.S. To 
this purpose we use a set of quarterly fiscal data taken from national accounts (in the case 
of the U.S. and the U.K.) or computed by drawing on the higher frequency (monthly) 
availability of fiscal cash data (in the case of the other countries). This is also a novelty 
with respect to the existing related literature, which generally focuses on annual data.1 
The results of the paper regarding fiscal developments suggest that fiscal positions 
have not significantly changed for Finland, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the 
U.S., they have improved for Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, while results suggest 
some fiscal deterioration for France. Moreover, the results show that while in the case of 
no change of the fiscal position this is due to the fact that higher responsiveness of revenue 
                                                          
1 Studies that also use higher frequency data, but in the specific context of testing fiscal sustainability via unit 
roort tests and cointegration, either quarterly or montly, are: Hakkio and Rush (1991) for US, Smith and Zin 
(1991) for Canada, Mac Donald (1992) for US, Baglioni and Cherubini (1993) for Italy, Quintos (1995) for 
the US, Haug (1995) for the US, and Hatemi-J (2002) for Sweden. Afonso (2005) provides a broader review 
of the empirical evidence. 
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is balanced by the higher responsiveness of spending, in the case of fiscal improvement 
this has been mainly driven by the higher responsiveness of revenue.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
review of the related empirical literature. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology we 
use to assess fiscal developments. Section 4 presents the data and how they are 
constructed. Section 5 reports and discusses the empirical results for assessing fiscal 
deterioration (or fiscal improvement). Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
Unit root and cointegration tests are commonly used to examine the sustainability of public 
finances and the possibility of fiscal deterioration if past fiscal policies are to be kept in the 
future. Standard empirical strategies focus on testing if the first differences of the debt 
series are stationary or if government spending and revenue are co-integrated. Common 
practice is to interpret rejection of these tests as evidence against either strong or weak 
fiscal sustainability, depending on how far from unity is the coefficient for government 
spending in the cointegration relationship between government spending and revenue. This 
interpretation is based on the work of Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh 
(1988, 1991), Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Quintos (1995).  In this framework, the 
empirical assessments of fiscal sustainability have been usually carried out on a country 
basis.  
More recently fiscal developments have also been assessed for the OECD and 
European Union country groupings, given that several economic and econometric 
arguments support the use of panel analysis for such purpose. Notably, Afonso and Rault 
(2007, 2008) used 1st and 2nd generation panel unit root tests as well as recent panel 
cointegration techniques that allow for correlation to be accommodated both within and 
between units. Within such strand of research, fiscal policies seem to have been 
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sustainable for the EU panel while estimations point to past fiscal developments being an 
issue in some countries. 
The long-term (i.e. cointegration) relationship between primary budget balances 
and government debt, essentially a fiscal reaction function, also provides evidence on the 
sustainability features of public finances.2 On the other hand, Bohn (2007) argues that 
rejection of sustainability based on standard (country specific) cointegration tests are 
invalid because the present-value borrowing constraint could be satisfied even if 
government spending and revenue are not cointegrated nor deficit and debt are difference- 
stationary.  
So far, few empirical studies have analysed the stability of the relation between 
spending and revenue by examining the influence of the changes in fiscal policy 
characteristics. Specifically, most of them identify only the fiscal policy characteristics 
affecting both spending and revenue without investigating whether their interplay and their 
time-varying nature may be responsible for future conditions of fiscal deterioration.  
Focusing only on government spending, Fatás and Mihov (2004, 2006) identify 
three fiscal policy characteristics explaining their evolution: responsiveness, persistence 
and discretionary. Afonso et al. (2008) extend the analysis of Fatás and Mihov (2006) by 
estimating, separately, two regression models relating government expenditure and 
revenue to the same common set of fiscal policy characteristics defined above. However, 
the use of a single equation estimation approach does not allow to assess whether, and to 
what extent, the time-varying behaviour of the fiscal policy characteristics may 
simultaneously influence the patterns of both expenditure and revenue and change their 
structural long-run relationship. In this respect, the empirical strategy used in our paper, 
                                                          
2 See Trehan and Walsh (1991), while Afonso (2008) also assesses such type of fiscal reaction functions for 
primary budget balances in a panel framework for the European Union countries. 
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based on the simultaneous estimation of both expenditure and revenue equations, makes it 
possible to overcome this problem. 
 
3. Methodology 
In order to assess fiscal developments and analyze the role of responsiveness and 
persistence in determining conditions of potential fiscal deterioration, we estimate 
recursively for each country i (with i =1,…,N ) the following system of structural 
equations: 
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where G is real government spending, R is real government revenue and Y is real GDP.  
For each sample of length k (where hkk   and kTh  ,,2,1  )3, the country-specific 
coefficient Eik measures the responsiveness of fiscal policy, that is, the behaviour of fiscal 
policy over the business cycle, while the coefficient Jik represents a measure of fiscal 
persistence, i.e. the degree of dependence of the current fiscal behaviour from its own past 
setting.  
We note that the variables entering system (1) are expressed in levels for three 
main reasons. First, as also done by Fatás and Mihov (2004, 2006) and Afonso et al. 
(2008), it is necessary to include in the regressions the level of the current and lagged 
value of government spending and revenue in order to capture the persistence of fiscal 
policy. Second, once the lagged dependent variable is used in levels, and considering the 
                                                          
3 k is the length of the sample window used to initialize the recursive estimation procedure. In our analysis, 
we set the window size equal to fifteen years, i.e. k =60 quarters. 
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fact that the series employed are not stationary, the inclusion of output expressed in first 
differences may lead to a situation where the coefficient of the lagged variable converges 
to one and the coefficient of the stationary series (output expressed in differences) 
converges to zero (see Wirjanto and Amano, 1996).  Third, the time series properties of G, 
R, and Y show that the series are integrated of order one and, at the same time, inspection 
of autocorrelation of the residuals of each equation in system (1) and unit root tests, 
indicate that they are stationary both for the entire sample and for each sample of length k.  
This implies that our estimates are super-consistent. Moreover, from a theoretical point of 
view, G and Y, and R and Y, should be cointegrated given that the spending-to-GDP and 
revenue-to-GDP ratios are bounded and strictly greater than zero. 
Difficulties in estimating system (1) are related to the presence of lagged 
endogenous variables among the explanatory variables. In order to insure consistent 
estimates from (1), we use a Three-Stage Least Square (TSLS) method (see e.g. Zellner 
and Theil, 1962). In particular, to avoid any endogeneity bias due to the simultaneity in the 
determination of output, government spending and revenue, we instrument for current 
GDP (Y) with two lags of GDP, the index of oil prices (see e.g. Fatás and Mihov 2003 and 
2006), and the lagged value for revenue and spending, respectively in the spending and 
revenue equation.  
After estimating recursively the system (1), we compute, for each country i and for 
each of the  1 kT  sets of parameters estimates (i.e. one set for each sample period), 
the Wald-statistics to test the following joint restrictions: 
 
 Rik
G
ik
R
ik
G
ikH EEJJ   :0 .         (2)  
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Testing jointly for the equality between the parameters of responsiveness and 
persistence associated to the government spending and revenue equations implies to 
investigate whether potential episodes of fiscal deterioration occurred during the time. If 
we accept the null hypothesis, we conclude that the behaviour of both government 
spending and revenues evolve dynamically in such a way to avoid any structural change of 
the fiscal position. On the contrary, rejection of the null hypothesis signals structural 
changes in the fiscal behaviour towards deterioration or improvement. In particular, in 
order to discriminate between these two cases, and to assess whether changes in the fiscal 
position are due to different responsiveness or persistence between government spending 
and revenue, we test the following single hypothesis: 
 
 0 1:       :
G R G R
ik ik ik ikH HJ J J J z              (3)  
                                              0 1:       :
G R G R
ik ik ik ikH HE E E E z .                                    (4) 
 
From the analysis of the single tests, and the analysis of the estimates of the 
parameters we can obtain three possible outcomes: i) fiscal deterioration (due to fiscal 
persistence and/or to fiscal responsiveness); ii) fiscal improvement (due to persistence 
and/or responsiveness); iii) indeterminacy, when government spending persistence is 
bigger than revenue persistence ( G Rik ikJ J! ), but spending responsiveness is lower than 
revenue responsiveness ( G Rik ikE E ),  and vice versa ( ; G R G Rik ik ik ikJ J E E ! ). 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data 
This section provides a summary description of the data employed in the empirical 
analysis. A detailed description is provided in the appendix. 
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Regarding the construction of our data set, and since we are interested in using high 
frequency fiscal data, drawing on quarterly (monthly) series, one has to use the available 
cash data, which, for some countries, indeed covers only the central government. 
Therefore, it is obviously not our purpose to extrapolate our results and findings for the 
general government. However, we believe that the gain of using high frequency fiscal data 
is paramount vis-à-vis the absence of quarterly data for the general government, 
particularly if the patterns are not too different, since it provides more in time information 
about possible future fiscal developments. Indeed, and as mentioned by Afonso and Sousa 
(2009), the patterns of such high frequency fiscal data follow very closely the 
developments of the annual national accounts data provided by the European Commission 
(AMECO database), while in most of the cases, the levels themselves are also close.4  
In our study we use quarterly data for nine countries: Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, U.K., and U.S. National currency data for all years 
prior to the switch of the euro area countries to the euro have been converted using the 
fixed euro conversion rate in order to provide comparable series across time for each 
country. All variables are seasonally adjusted and are expressed in natural logarithms of 
real terms. 
For the government finance statistics – that is, government spending and 
government revenue – and, in the case of the euro area countries, we use budgetary data on 
a cash basis.5 It normally refers to the Central Government, therefore, with the exclusion of 
the Local and/or the Regional Authorities. The data is typically disseminated through the 
monthly publications of the General Accounting Offices, Ministries of Finance, National 
                                                          
4 Other studies have also used central government cash data, and explained its relevance, namely, Pérez 
(2007), Castro Fernández and Hernández de Cos (2006), Biau and Girard (2005), Heppke-Falk et al. (2006), 
and Giordano et al. (2005). 
5 Onorante et al. (2008) discuss some issues about infra-annual budgetary cash data, namely, the accounting 
procedures, the methods of compilation, the timing of recording of transactions, and the coverage of budgets. 
The authors show that the data can be useful for fiscal forecasting in the euro area. 
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Central Banks and National Statistical Institutes of the respective countries. The latest 
figures are also published in the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) section of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) website, to which euro area Member States 
contribute. For the U.S., we consider the Federal Government spending and revenue, 
whilst, for the U.K., figures correspond to the Public Sector. That is, both for the U.S. and 
the U.K., quarterly fiscal data is available directly from national accounts. 
For GDP and GDP deflator, we use the International Financial Statistics from the 
IMF. 
The data are available in the following samples: 1980:1-2007:3, for Belgium; 
1970:1-2007:4, for Finland; 1970:2-2007:2, for France; 1979:1-2007:2, for Germany; 
1980:1-2007:3, for Italy; 1977:1-2007:1, for the Netherlands; 1985:1-2006:4, for Spain; 
1955:2-2007:4, for the U.K.; and, 1967:2-2007:4, for the U.S.6 
 
4.2. Results and discussion 
 In this section we report and discuss the estimates of or measures of responsiveness 
and persistence, as well as the tests discussed in the second section, for each country in our 
sample. Table 1 summarises the recursive estimates of the responsiveness and persistence 
coefficients. In addition, Table 2 provides the estimates of those measures for two sub-
periods: before and after 1992, for the European Union countries (Maastricht); and with a 
split in 1987:3 for the US (before and after Greenspan). 
 
 
                                                          
6 Some infra-annual budgetary cash data is interpolated due to the existence of missing values: for France, 
January and February of the years of 1970 and 1976-1993. In the case of Germany, we also include: (i) one 
dummy for the period after 1991:1 (inclusive), corresponding to the German reunification; and (ii) another 
dummy for 2000:3, to track the spike in government revenue associated with the sale of UMTS (Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System) licenses. For Belgium, we add a dummy for the period after 1991:1 
(inclusive) to account for the substantial fall in government spending. Finally, for France, we add a dummy 
to track the spike in government spending in the period 1993: 4. 
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Table 1 – Recursive window estimates for responsiveness and persistence 
First 60 quarters Full sample 
Responsiveness Persistence Wald tests Responsiveness Persistence Wald tests Country 
 GEˆ REˆ GJˆ RJˆ EW JW jointW GEˆ REˆ GJˆ RJˆ EW JW jointW
BEL -0.13 0.53*** 0.16*** 0.16 19.1*** 0.0 22.0*** -0.12** 0.54** 0.24*** 0.48*** 39.3*** 5.4** 73.2*** 
ESP 0.50*** 0.82*** 0.49*** 0.34*** 3.6 1.4 4.8* 0.02 0.18*** 0.79*** 0.66*** 8.01*** 3.63* 8.04** 
FIN 0.65*** 1.01*** 0.60*** 0.07 2.6 11.0*** 30.1*** 0.12*** 0.65*** 0.90*** 0.44*** 31.4*** 34.3*** 34.4*** 
FRA 0.31*** 0.73*** 0.66*** 0.24** 7.1*** 7.8*** 7.9** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.3 0.0 2.8 
GER 0.21*** 0.33*** 0.69*** 0.60*** 1.7 0.7 1.8 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.76*** 0.69*** 2.5 0.9 3.2 
ITA 1.24*** 1.35*** -0.04 0.23** 0.1 2.6* 13.5*** 0.36*** 0.82*** 0.18** 0.29*** 12.4*** 1.0 37.9*** 
NLD 0.27*** 0.42*** 0.66*** 0.57*** 1.4 0.6 1.4 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.49*** 0.57*** 1.3 1.2 12.9 
UK 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.80*** 0.85*** 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 0.3 0.5 0.7 
US 0.12 0.33*** 0.91*** 0.70*** 2.7* 4.1** 4.9* 0.03 0.18*** 0.97*** 0.82*** 11.0*** 11.0*** 11.0*** 
Notes: EW - Wald test for
G RE E . WJ - Wald test for G RJ J . EW - Wald test for G RE E . jointW - Wald test 
for
G R G RE E J J   . *,**,***, respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Sub-period estimates for responsiveness and persistence 
[…, 1991Q4] [1992Q1, …] 
Responsiveness Persistence Wald tests Responsiveness Persistence Wald tests Country 
GEˆ REˆ GJˆ RJˆ EW JW jointW GEˆ REˆ GJˆ RJˆ EW JW jointW
BEL -0.11 0.48*** 0.12 0.20 22.8*** 0.28 33.1*** -0.12 0.33*** 0.27** 0.33** 29.9*** 0.18 40.4*** 
ESP 1.57*** 2.12*** -0.34** -0.12 2.2 1.3 22.9*** -0.19*** 0.07 0.59*** 0.58*** 13.7*** 0.0 13.9*** 
FIN 0.29*** 0.90*** 0.81*** 0.28*** 13.1*** 19.1*** 26.0*** 0.07 0.58*** 0.20* 0.40*** 15.9*** 1.5 43.4*** 
FRA 0.34*** 0.77*** 0.61*** 0.17* 11.6*** 11.7*** 11.9*** 0.00 -0.02 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.0 0.2 0.2 
GER 0.28*** 0.66*** 0.51*** 0.14 7.9*** 4.1** 9.3*** 0.03 0.20*** 0.83*** 0.64*** 4.0** 2.6 4.0 
ITA 1.06*** 1.58*** 0.18 0.15 1.7 0.0 5.0* -0.00 0.61*** -0.02 0.02 8.5*** 0.1 9.4*** 
NLD 0.27*** 0.42*** 0.67*** 0.59*** 1.4 0.5 1.5 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.52*** 0.0 2.7* 3.4 
UK 0.06** 0.09** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.04 0.37*** 1.00*** 0.68*** 11.8*** 12.0*** 12.0*** 
US 0.07 0.33*** 0.94*** 0.68*** 6.9*** 10.2*** 12.8*** 0.05 0.08* 0.95*** 0.92*** 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Notes: EW - Wald test for
G RE E . WJ - Wald test for G RJ J . EW - Wald test for G RE E . jointW - Wald test 
for
G R G RE E J J   . *,**,***, respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. For the US the two sub-period cut-off 
date is 1987Q3.  
 
Belgium 
The case of Belgium is a particularly interesting one. As it is possible to see from 
Figure 1d Belgium has been characterized by fiscal deterioration at the beginning of the 
1980s, and by fiscal consolidation afterward. Our results seem to confirm this evidence. In 
Figures 1a and 1b we report the recursive estimates over time of our measures of 
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persistence and responsiveness for government spending and revenue. Looking at the 
figures, we can observe, that the estimates of both persistence and responsiveness of 
government revenue are higher than the ones of government spending. In particular, Wald 
tests indicate that the discrepancy in the behaviour of government spending and revenue is 
highly significant for most of the sample windows (see also Table 1). This suggests that in 
our period of observation (1980:1-2007:2) fiscal consolidation has occurred in Belgium, 
and it has been driven by the higher responsiveness and persistence of government 
revenue, compared to spending. Moreover, splitting the sample period in two sub-periods, 
before and after the Maastricht Treaty, we can see that fiscal consolidation in both periods 
has been characterised by higher responsiveness in government revenue (see Table 2). 
 
France 
The fiscal balance in France was relatively stable, although in deficit (see Figure 
2d), in the first part of the last three decades, at least if compared to other Economic and 
Monetary Union members (such as Belgium and Italy).  
However, our results suggest that a significant fiscal deterioration has occurred 
during the period 2000-2002 (see Figures 2a, 2b and 2c). Until 1998:4 spending 
responsiveness is statistically significantly lower than revenue responsiveness and 
spending persistence is statistically significant bigger than the revenue one, which would 
imply an overall balanced behaviour. Instead, during the period 2000-2002, government 
spending persistence is significantly higher that revenue one whilst the null of equality 
between government spending and government revenue responsiveness is accepted. 
Indeed, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the periods of fiscal deterioration for 
France during 2000-2002 are mainly driven by the higher persistence of spending.   
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Finland 
Public finances have been always quite sound during the last three decades (an 
exception is represented by the fiscal deterioration during the crisis of the first half of the 
1990s).  Moreover, looking at Figure 3d, we can see that no major changes in the budget 
balance seem to have occurred. Our analysis provides similar conclusions, but also shows 
how this fiscal position has been achieved trough a different behaviour of spending and 
revenue in terms of responsiveness and persistence (see Figures 3a and 3b). In particular, 
while government spending persistence has been higher than government revenue 
persistence, revenue has been more responsive than spending. This is also confirmed by 
the analysis for the two sub-periods (see Table 1 and 2). 
 
Germany 
The pattern of the budget balance depicted in Figure 4d, seems to suggest that 
neither strong fiscal improvements nor deteriorations have occurred in Germany in the last 
three decades. This hypothesis has been confirmed by our analysis. In fact, as it is possible 
to see by the joint and the single tests (see Figures 4a, 4b and 4c), the difference, both in 
terms of responsiveness and persistence, between government spending and revenue is 
never statistically significant. Moreover, it does not seem that a strikingly different 
behaviour before and after 1992 has emerged (see Table 2). Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to observe that magnitude of government revenue responsiveness declined after 2000-
2001, while it remained rather stable for government spending, somewhat anticipating a 
situation of lower revenues and the Excessive Deficit Procedure that Germany faced in 
2002.7 
 
                                                          
7 Afonso and Claeys (2007) mention that a large revenue reduction, unmatched by expenditure cuts in 
Germany, pushed the deficit beyond 3% in 2002. 
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Italy 
Budget deficits have been considerably high and increasing during the 1970s and 
the 1980s, and only started decreasing after the beginning of the 1990s (see Figure 5d). 
Our analysis, which starts in 1980:1, uncovers empirical evidence for fiscal consolidation 
in the period after the Maastricht Treaty (see Table 2). Moreover, from the analysis of the 
coefficients and the associated Wald tests, we can argue that fiscal improvements in the 
second half of the 1990s have been achieved rather through higher revenue responsiveness 
(see Figure 5b). Indeed, the null hypothesis of identical government revenue and spending 
responsiveness is mostly rejected after 1997. 
 
Netherlands 
Fiscal balances have improved in the Netherlands in the 1990s, after some 
deterioration in the 1980s. This is (partly) captured by our analysis. In particular, looking 
at the pattern of the estimates of responsiveness and persistence, we can see that around 
1996 government revenue has become more persistent than government spending, after 
several years where the situation was the opposite (see Figure 6a). In contrast, regarding 
responsiveness, government revenue and spending do not seem to have differed in 
statistically significant terms (see Figure 6b), apart from the period 2000:2-2001:3, when 
spending responsiveness decreased and the budget position improved (see Figure 6d). 
 
Spain 
Analyzing the pattern for fiscal budget balances in Spain, we can see that there has 
been a process of fiscal consolidation from 1995 onwards. In fact the budget deficit passed 
from above 6% of GDP in 1995 to a surplus of 2.3% of GDP in 2007. The joint test of our 
measure of persistence confirms this outcome (see Figure 7c). However, and for the period 
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of analysis, we can reject that the measures of persistence and responsiveness are the same 
(see Figure 7c). In particular, while government spending has been more persistent than 
government revenue, revenue was more responsive than spending. This, together with the 
fact that the levels of deficit and debt have been reduced over time, seems to point out that 
the higher responsiveness of revenue more than balanced the higher persistence of 
spending. 
 
 
United Kingdom 
Fiscal balances in the UK have been quite stable with the debt-to-GDP ratio 
decreasing throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 8d). In particular, except for 2000 
and 2001 (due to relatively high GDP growth), it is possible to argue that there has not 
been any significant changes towards fiscal improvement or deterioration. This was mainly 
due to the fact that higher government spending and revenue showed a very similar 
behaviour in terms of persistence and responsiveness (see Figures 8a and 8b). 
 
USA 
Similarly to the UK, the fiscal balances in the U.S. have been quite stable, although 
in deficit, with an improvement of the fiscal position between 1992 and 2000 (see Figure 
9d).  Overall, it is possible to argue that there has not been any significant long-term 
change towards fiscal consolidation or deterioration. Unlike the case of UK, however, this 
was due to the fact that higher revenue responsiveness has been balanced by higher 
spending persistence (see Figures 9a and 9b). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 In this work, we propose a new approach to assess long-term fiscal developments. 
By analyzing the time-varying behaviour of the two components of government spending 
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and revenues – that is, responsiveness and persistence –, we are able to infer about the 
sources of fiscal deterioration and/or fiscal improvement. Drawing on quarterly data we 
use a Three-Stage Least Square method and recursively estimate those components within 
a system of government revenue and spending equations. 
 The results suggest that fiscal deterioration has not been an issue for the majority 
of the countries analyzed. In fact, fiscal position has not significantly changed for Finland, 
France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the US, whilst it has even improved for 
Belgium, Italy, and Netherlands.  
 We show that, for Italy, Belgium and (partially) for the Netherlands, fiscal 
improvement has been mainly driven by a higher responsiveness of government revenue 
relative to government spending. On the other hand, in the case of France, periods of fiscal 
deterioration can be attributed to the higher persistence of spending. This result is in line 
with the argument that although revenue is more responsive than spending, spending is 
more persistent than revenue (see Afonso, et al. 2008). 
 Additionally, we have not detected conditions for potential fiscal deterioration or 
fiscal improvement in the other European Union countries (Finland, Germany, Spain, and 
the UK) plus the U.S.  For these countries, the empirical evidence suggests that non-
significant change in the fiscal position is due to a similar behaviour in terms of 
persistence and responsiveness of government spending and government revenue or 
because higher revenue responsiveness has been balanced by higher spending persistence. 
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Appendix. Data description and sources 
A.1 Belgium Data 
 
GDP
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " 
IFS.Q.124.9.9B.B$$.Z.W.$$$"). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 
ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1980:1-2007:3. 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). The source is the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics (series IFS.Q.124.9.9B.BIP.Z.F.$$$”). We seasonally 
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1980:1-2007:3. 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the Belgium Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is defined as State 
Government expenditure on a cash basis (series “BISM.M.FJHC.BE.91”). We seasonally 
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1967:1-2008:1. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the Belgium Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is defined as State 
Government revenue on a cash basis (series “BISM.M.FJBC.BE.91”). We seasonally 
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1967:1-2008:1. 
 
A.2 Finland Data 
 
GDP
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " 
IFS.Q.172.9.9B.B$$.Z.W.$$$"). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 
ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:4 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). The source is the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics (series “IFS.Q.172.9.9B.BIP.Z.F.$$”). We seasonally 
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1970:1-2007:4.  
 
Government Spending 
The source is the IMF via Finnish Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is defined 
as State Government expenditure on a cash basis (series “IFS.M.17282...ZF...”). We 
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the 
period 1970:1-2007:4. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the IMF via Finnish Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is defined as 
State Government revenue on a cash basis (series “IFS.M.17281...ZF...”). We seasonally 
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adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1970:1-2007:4. 
 
A.3 France Data 
 
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2. 
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " 
IFS.Q.132.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$"). 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, International 
Financial Statistics (series “IFS.Q.132.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$”). 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the IMF via French Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is defined as 
State Government expenditure on a cash basis (series “IFS.M.13282z..ZF...”). We 
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the 
period 1970:1-2007:2. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the IMF via French Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is defined as 
State Government revenue on a cash basis (series “IFS.M.13281...ZF...”). We seasonally 
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1970:1-2007:2. 
 
A.4 Germany Data  
 
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:4. 
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series 
"IFS.Q.134.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$"). 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, International 
Financial Statistics (series "IFS.Q.134.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$”). 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the Bundesbank and the Monthly Reports released by the German Ministry 
of Finance. Government Spending is defined as General Government total expenditure on 
a cash basis. We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series 
comprise the period 1979:1-2007:3. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the Bundesbank and the Monthly Reports released by the German Ministry 
of Finance. Government Revenue is defined as General Government total revenue on a 
cash basis. We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series 
comprise the period 1979:1-2007:3. 
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A.5 Italy Data 
 
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:3. 
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series 
"IFS.Q.136.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$"). 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, and comprise the period 1980:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, International 
Financial Statistics (series “IFS.Q.136.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$”). 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the Bank of Italy and the Italian Ministry of Finance. Government Spending 
is defined as Central Government primary expenditure on a cash basis. We seasonally 
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1960:1-2007:4. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the Bank of Italy and the Italian Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue 
is defined as Central Government total revenue on a cash basis. We seasonally adjust 
quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1960:1-
2007:4. 
 
A.6 Spain Data 
 
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2. 
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " 
IFS.Q.184.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$"). 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, International 
Financial Statistics (series “IFS.Q.184.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$”). 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the IMF via Spanish Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is defined 
as State Government expenditure on a cash basis (series “IFS.M.18482...Zf...”). We 
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the 
period 1985:1-2006:4. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the IMF via Spanish Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is defined as 
State Government revenue on a cash basis (series “IFS.M.18481...Zf...”). We seasonally 
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1986:1-2006:4. 
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A.7 Netherlands Data 
 
GDP
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " 
IFS.Q.138.9.9B.B$C.Z.W.$$$"). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 
ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:4. 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). The source is the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics (series “IFS.Q.138.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$”). We seasonally 
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1970:1-2007:2. 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the IMF via Dutch Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is defined as 
State Government expenditure on a cash basis (series “IFS.M.138.C.C2.$$$.C.G.$$$”). 
We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise 
the period 1970:1-2007:1. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the IMF via Dutch Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is defined as 
State Government revenue on a cash basis (series “IFS.M.138.C.C1.$$$.C.G.$$$”). We 
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the 
period 1970:1-2007:1. 
 
A.8 U.K. Data 
 
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1955:1-2007:4. 
The source is the Office for National Statistics, Release UKEA, Table A1 (series 
"YBHA"). 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, 
and comprise the period 1955:1-2007:4. The source is the Office for National Statistics, 
Release MDS, Table 1.1 (series “YBGB”). 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the Office for National Statistics (ONS), Release Public Sector Accounts. 
Government Spending is defined as total current expenditures of the Public Sector ESA 95 
(series “ANLT”) less net investment (series “ANNW”). We seasonally adjust quarterly 
data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the Office for National Statistics (ONS), Release Public Sector Accounts. 
Government Revenue is defined as total current receipts of the Public Sector ESA 95 
(series “ANBT”). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the 
series comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
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A.9 U.S. Data 
 
GDP
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5, line 1. Data for GDP are 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, 
and comprise the period 1967:1-2007:4. The source is the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
NIPA Tables 1.1.5 and 1.1.6, line 1. 
 
Government Spending 
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 3.2. Government Spending is 
defined as total Federal Government Current Expenditure (line 39). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:4. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 3.2. Government Revenue is 
defined as government receipts at annual rates (line 36). Data are quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, and comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
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